We report on the application of an innovative web-based tool to investigate aspects of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS.) The system's high profile has attracted serious criticism for failure to provide relevant threat information, in particular the nature, location and timing of the threat. Our experiments provide a mechanism for analyzing the current systems weaknesses and should aid in the search to improve its value as a risk communication mechanism. Employing the interactive and graphical features of the internet, we conduct experiments in which subjects faced with potential security threats can purchase more detailed (more spatially accurate) alert information and concurrently choose appropriate preparation and response actions. Empirical analysis of subject responses reveal that more geographically detailed threat warnings have value that increases with the level of the threat, and that people base their intended responses on the information and the level of the threat. This research supports the need for more spatially detailed terrorist threat information, made easier with the use of maps.
Introduction
On August 1, 2004, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge raised the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat level from yellow to orange for the sixth time since its inception in March of 2002 (Ridge, 2004.) 1 While the system has five threat levels, ranging from (1)green-low condition through (3)yellowelevated condition to (5)red-severe condition, it has only ever been set to two of those levels-yellow by default and orange for short periods of time. When established, the system was intended "to provide a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State and local authorities and to the American people." (Bush, 2002) The system has become a key element of the Government's campaign against terrorism through the role it plays in Homeland Security. The threat level is prominently displayed on Government websites, especially the Department of Homeland Security website, but also many private agencies, including the Red Cross. The current HSAS threat level has been continuously displayed on the CNN/Headline News banner that shows at the bottom of the television screen. The system is not only intended to communicate timely and relevant information about security risks and terrorist threats, it contains information about precautions that agencies, businesses and members of the public can take against the threat. (GAO, 2004b, p4.) modification and improvement, while maintaining it as a fundamentally sound component of homeland security.
Having such a high profile opens the HSAS up to severe scrutiny, which it has received, and of which more is detailed below. To many critics it falls short as a risk communication mechanism, and may actually contribute to the general level of fear, uncertainty, distrust and complacency in the nation (Pena, 2002.) This paper reports on a research project designed to analyze important characteristics and elements of the system to both model its weaknesses and identify opportunities to strengthen it. We have created a set of web-based instruments capable of studying various elements of a security threat warning system, and have obtained an initial set of data from these instruments. Set up as experimental scenarios, subjects are placed in a risky situation and required to respond to threat warnings. Initially the experiments concentrate on the geographic or spatial detail of threat warnings, but subsequently we will be investigating warning content, timing and audience. Our research plan allows us to study the following dimensions of an Alert System:
1. What kind of threat and risk information can be derived from intelligence, and how much detail should be communicated? 2. When is threat information disclosed and to whom? 3. Should warnings indicate the level of confidence the DHS has in the intelligence? 4. What geographical (spatial) detail should be provided? 5. What temporal detail should warnings contain, both in terms of when and what duration to expect for the identified threat? 6. How much uncertainty is associated with the spatial and temporal dimensions of the warning, and how is this communicated? 7. Should warnings be tailored to audiences and to multiple methods of dissemination? 8. How should threat levels be linked to response?
Because our experiments place subjects in situations where they respond to threats and warnings, we can observe the response to warnings and address the following behavioral questions:
9. What kind of threat/risk information do people value more highly and how does their response vary with the kind of information? 10. Are people more sensitive to changes in the threat level than the actual current level? 11. Are people's preferred responses consistent with the HSAS advised responses? 12. What do the respondents believe they are protecting when they receive a change in threat level?
In the sections to follow we provide an overview of the HSAS focusing on the limitations of the system that have been identified to date and then describe the experiments that will be used to investigate some of the suggested and possible modifications to the system. This is followed by a discussion of the initial data gathered and analyses that are made possible by the experimental design, and then we conclude with a plan for continued development of this line of research.
Background
Since its formation by Homeland Security Presidential Directive -3 in March of 2002, the HSAS has remained on a default level of yellow (level 3 of 5.) This threat level is officially described as:
3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: a) Increasing surveillance of critical locations; b) Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions; c) Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and d) Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans. (Bush, 2002) There is little in the way of risk information in this definition, yet it has become the "base line" for homeland security since early 2002. In fact, the threat levels contain so little risk information that the only value of the system may arise when the threat level definitions is changed, since this is usually accompanied by a statement from the Secretary of Homeland Security. Including the recent rise in August 1, 2004, the threat level has been increased to orange 6 times for a total of approximately 100 days. In his statement announcing the increase in threat level from yellow to orange on August 1
Secretary Ridge stated (Ridge, 2004) :
"Now this afternoon, we do have new and unusually specific information about where al-Qaeda would like to attack. And as a result, today, the United States Government is raising the threat level to Code Orange for the financial services sector in New York City, Northern New Jersey and Washington, DC. "This will allow us to increase protection in and around those buildings that require it, and also raise awareness for employees, and residents, and customers, and visitors. We know, and we know from experience, that increased physical protection and added vigilance from citizens can thwart a terrorist attack. And that is our goal. "Now this is the first time we have chosen to use the Homeland Security Advisory System in such a targeted way. Compared to previous threat reporting, these intelligence reports have provided a level of detail that is very specific. The quality of this intelligence, based on multiple reporting streams in multiple locations, is rarely seen and it is alarming in both the amount and specificity of the information."
Even though this warning contains specific types of targets (financial services) and specific geographical locations (New York City, Northern New Jersey and Washington DC) there is no information as to the type of terrorist activity, the risk to property and life, and the timing of the possible attacks. Criticism was quick to emerge (Purdum, 2004) :
"On Sunday, the Bush administration won praise for a warning much more precise than those in the past -limited to financial service institutions in New York, New Jersey and Washington -then drew skepticism when law enforcement officials let it be known later that much of the information that led to the alert may have been newly discovered in Pakistan, but was three or four years old." Despite the calls for threat level announcements to contain substantially more detail, the system contributes to the overall status of awareness, preparedness, mitigation and response to terrorist threats in the country. Unfortunately, the HSAS is not the only risk and threat warning system, nor is it more than advisory for the majority of organizations in the nation. The HSAS applies directly to all federal government agencies, except for the Department of Defense, which has its own threat warning system (Force Protection Condition), based on much of the same intelligence that the HSAS is, but which does not share the same threat levels, terminology or protective response measures. (Allen, 2004, p.4) In a recent GAO report, 42 of 43 states reporting indicated they followed the HSAS or had an equivalent system, or both, but in many cases actions specified in response to each threat level are more regional, local and specific. , 2004.) This means that the effectiveness of a threat warning system is critically dependent on the voluntary participation of many businesses and individuals to contribute information necessary to interpret intelligence information into risk assessment and advice for the appropriate actions to mitigate against, prepare for and respond to threats.
Through both the HSAS level descriptions and the announcements of threat level changes, the emphasis is on the appropriate actions to take in response to the new threat.
Reflecting on the vast research literature on risk perception and communication, Tierney and Clark (2003) state that warnings should be understandable, personal and actionable to individuals. In its review of the HSAS, the GAO identifies the following requirements for effective risk assessment:
1. Specific information including: a. the nature of the threat b. when and where it is likely to occur, and c. over what period 2. Guidance on actions to be taken. (GOA, 2004b, p.9) One major problem with the current HSAS and associated announcements remains that the threat is poorly specified, such that even if responsive actions are indicated, agencies, businesses and the public will not take any action since they do not know to exactly what threat they are reacting. Yet the objective of the HSAS is to create not a nation in perpetual fear, but one that is vigilant, aware and responsive, something that many critics currently believe is unattainable with the HSAS (Ridge, 2004.) 2.2 What are the criticisms of the current system?
The most cynical of criticisms of the HSAS is that threat level changes are primarily symbolic (Pena, 2002.) For example, in Secretary Ridge's most recent announcement of a geographically specific increase in threat level to orange, he stated: "Rest assured, rest assured that the most talented security professionals and law enforcement professionals around this country are working hard every single day to protect all regions of the country and all sectors of our economy. "There is much we can each do to remain vigilant, to be on watch, to be aware of unusual patterns or vehicles, and to report suspicious activities. And so this afternoon, I ask our citizens for their watchful eyes as we continue to monitor the situation." (Ridge, 2004.) In testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on national security, emerging threats and international relations Committee on Government Reform, Kenneth Allen, representing the Partnership for Public Warning (PPW,) commented that the HSAS is a "threat assessment system" not a complete warning system. He states, "the HSAS is America's mood ring." Reporting on invited public comment in November 2003, Mr. Allen identifies the following criticisms of the system: a) The system is too vague, such that the nature of the threat remains unknown, and appropriate response is indeterminate. b) One color across the nation is too general. c) The HSAS is inconsistent with other, existing, warning systems, which causes confusion in the minds of people. d) The system relies too heavily on media reporting of announcements, rather than the established and traditional warning systems and networks.
In its review of the HSAS, the GAO responds to the lack of specificity in threat announcements that it makes with the recommendation that the DHS document its communication protocols regarding threat level changes including the methods, timing, and content of guidance and threat information to be shared (GAO, 2004c, p.39.) Similarly, in reference to the amount of specific information conveyed by the HSAS, the Gilmore Commission reported (Gilmore, 2003) :
"The Homeland Security Advisory System has become largely marginalized. This may be attributed to a lack of understanding of its intended use as well as the absence of a well-orchestrated plan to guide its implementation at all levels of government. The Governor of Hawaii chose to maintain a blue level in February 2003 when the Federal government raised the level to orange, and the Governor of Arizona announced that his State might do the same based on the particular threat or lack thereof to Arizona."
Speaking to the marginalization of the HSAS, the GAO (2004c) report suggests that Federal agencies varied their responses little when the threat level changed from Yellow to Orange. This was due to the high level of security that has now become the default level at these agencies and locations. Yet these are the organizations for which the Advisory is binding. In contrast, those state and local governments, private businesses and the public for whom the HSAS is advisory actually vary their response to threat level changes. (GAO, 2004c, p.24 ) However, much less in known as to how these organizations respond to threat level changes, or especially among the public, whether they alter their behavior at all.
Due to lack of specific information, preparation and response can be inappropriate, in terms of type, level and timing. This ultimately means the misallocation of valuable resources to the activity of national security. 4 The country has developed an impressive organization to cope with natural hazards, which is employed almost year round mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, high winds, fires, and even man-made disasters. Many critics have called for the integration of the HSAS into an all-hazards warning system in recognition of the infrastructure that currently exists (Allen, 2004 .)
The experiments developed in our research program are designed to investigate many of the issues and criticisms identified above. We consider the design elements of a terrorist alert system, as well as the behavioral response to system alternatives under varying threats, all in a decision environment where warnings and responses have real economic costs and benefits. The experimental design is described in the next section.
The experiments
Vernon Smith (1987, p.7) has identified the study of choice under uncertainty as one of the two primary roles played by experimental economics. Moreover, experiments require the following 5 conditions to hold to be valid: non-satiation, saliency, dominance, privacy and parallelism (Smith, 1987, p. 7.) In designing our experiments we have attempted to satisfy all of these criteria to create a decision environment from which observed behavior is relevant in making policy statements about the HSAS, or some alternative alert system.
Our first goal has been to design a situation that contains the essential elements of the current system, recognizing that a major criticism of the current system is the very limited information it conveys concerning the nature of the terrorist threat. To this end, the experiment subjects can purchase improved threat information, in the form of more spatially detailed threat level code maps, and then choose a corresponding response of the kind suggested by DHS and the Red Cross. Subjects earn money as they progress through the experiment, which they can spend on purchasing detailed threat maps, and which they can possibly lose if actual threats are realized during the experiment.
We are using an innovative web-based survey and interactive data-gathering instrument that we have used successfully in prior research (Bernknopf, Brookshire and Ganderton, 2003 .) The first application is a pilot study to gather preliminary data and test the methodology with student subjects recruited in UNM fall session classes. Students were invited to visit the experiment website being hosted at UNM and register to participate. They are told that with their participation they will be compensated for their time and effort by printing a claim check upon completion of the experiment and presenting it to the staff in the university's economics department.
Once subjects choose to visit the site, they are asked to register as new users. As a new user the subject is immediately sent to the informed consent page. Given there is no physical or contemporaneous contact with the subject, by clicking on the "I agree"
button the subject is providing consent. If the subject does not consent, they simply exit the website by closing the browser, going to another website, or backing out of the webpage. If the subjects give consent they are taken to the Introduction, or home page, which provides details of the experiment and tells them there are two components, a survey and a main game. The first section requiring subject response is the short survey of 6 questions, 3 addressing awareness of the Threat level advisory system and 3 asking demographic questions of the subject. Upon completing the survey, the subject is shown the main experiment introduction page. The experiment interface page is shown next, and the subject spends about 10 rounds at this page, which is updated after each response/input from the subject as the game proceeds.
The Main Page provides the subject with information on experimental parameters, what decisions must be made, and how to proceed. The subject must make two decisions to precede through the experiment each round: to buy the detailed map or not, and to choose an appropriate response to the threat. Both these responses are recorded to the database in real time, as are subject earnings, in order to calculate payment at the end of the experiment. The subject may exit the experiment website at any time, and return to complete the experiment at any time. They cannot obtain the compensation claim check without finishing all rounds. After completing the Main experiment rounds, which would take approximately 15 minutes, the subject is sent to the claim check page.
The threat warning is provided in the form of a map, initially showing 4 cells, each colored using the same colors as the HSAS (we use the three highest levelsyellow, orange and red.) The probability of a terrorist attack is given and fixed, but the spatial distribution of the threat level varies as a treatment between rounds. This model was chosen to reflect the actual nature of terrorist threats to date: some areas or sectors are considered more at risk from a particular attack, while others would remain relatively unaffected by the same event. The more spatially detailed threat map provides subjects with more specific spatial threat information, upon which they can make their desired response.
Data, analysis and results
The experiment website was developed and tested, then opened to general use by subjects during a 3 week period in October 2004. During this time 53 subjects registered and completed the experiment and generated over 500 observations for inclusion in this analysis. The data are of a panel nature, with each subject generating an average of 10 observations over a subset of treatments that includes different threat maps and varying detailed map costs. Subject decision variables include map purchase and threat response.
In addition to the experimental data, each subject is required to complete a short survey covering their knowledge and experience of the HSAS and some basic demographics.
The data allow us to test the following hypotheses:
H1: More spatially detailed threat information has value as expressed by a positive willingness to pay. H2: The demand for more spatially detailed threat warnings is cost sensitive. H3: Costly response actions are more likely at higher threat levels. H4: People are not subject to the "Cry Wolf" syndrome postulated by Gruntfest and Carsell (2000.) H5: Responses match threat levels better for those people with higher HSAS awareness.
In these experiments, each subject acts independently, attempting to maximize the earnings from the experiment as a return on the investment of time and effort at the website. Each round the subject earns an income, in tokens, that is threatened by terrorist activity, information about which is provided via the threat level map. While the probability of an attack is fixed, and given, the subject's location, and hence threat level and associated loss, is randomly chosen each round. Initially the subject sees the very coarse, four sector map, where the threat level color is determined by the modal color of the 9 segments within that sector. By buying the detailed map which reveals all 36 segments to the subject, he or she is buying more information about the probability distribution of loss which theoretically makes the calculation of expected loss, and choice of appropriate response, easier. The decision to purchase the detailed map is therefore based on the potential benefits a subject expects from greater information about the spatial distribution of loss amounts and location within that space. The subject will compare the cost of purchasing the map with the benefits of a potentially more accurate calculation of expected losses from the hazard.
The subject is also asked to choose their most preferred response to the threat they perceive at their location on the map. The response is gathered using the following question:
What would you expect to do under this terrorist threat level? 1. do nothing different 2. be more alert at work and in public places 3. stay home from work and tune into the radio or TV for news 4. gather my family and evacuate to a safer place Each of these responses involves an increasing amount of effort and implicit cost to the subject. The subject should choose a higher cost response the higher the expected value of the perceived loss from the terrorist threat.
The empirical model entails two equations, one to explain the decision to purchase a map, the other the preferred response to the threat. Table 1 lists the variables used in the empirical analysis and provides definitions for these variables. The first set of variables gives some descriptive statistics for the sample of subjects participating in the experiment. Under half were female (41%) and nearly half were over 21 years old (47%.) About one-third of the sample subjects were aware of the current threat level and correctly identified it as yellow (38%,) while 42 percent were completely unaware of the current threat level. 5 About 40 percent of subjects were able to identify the appropriate response, as recommended by the DHS and the Red Cross, to a given threat level. Table 1 also gives other statistics for the experiment. An actual terrorist attack never occurred during the experiment, which given the very low probability of such an event is not unexpected. Table 2 summarizes how the 515 decisions were categorized by threat level, response to threat, and the decision to buy a map. On only 32% if occasions did subjects buy the detailed map, but purchase was more likely if the subject was in a higher threat zone. In only approximately 20% of cases did respondents indicate they would do nothing in response to the threat of a terrorist attack and generally the more 5 There were subjects who incorrectly stated the current threat level.
severe the threat, the more likely subjects were to plan on more costly responses, including evacuation to a safer location. Some specific responses are anomalous, but this could be due to the small sample size, and the fact that the same subject generated multiple observations. As discussed above, a bivariate probit model was chosen to model the decision to purchase the detailed map and to choose a response to the threat. The results of this estimation appear in Table 3 . There are two basic specifications of the bivariate probit model: one named Cluster, the other No Cluster. Since each subject generates more than one observation for the analysis, there is potential for non-independent observations and correlated errors. This potential is explicitly modeled in the Cluster specification, where the parameter values do not differ, but the standard errors are estimated more efficiently. Notes: 1. Estimates are full information maximum likelihood. 2. Clustering allows for correlated errors within observations from the same subject, but none across subjects. 3. Coefficients in bold are significantly different from zero at 95% confidence level For most coefficients in both tables the standard errors are smaller for the Cluster estimates. This suggests that explicitly modeling the within-subject error correlations results in more efficient estimates of the coefficients. Estimates for rho, the correlation of errors between the two equations are provided in the tables. For the model presented, with and without correction for panel data, there is a statistically significant correlation between the errors of the map purchase and threat response decision. While the model specification is quite consistent with the proposition that threat response is dependent in part on map purchase, the presence of a significant correlation between factors influencing the two decisions is due not to the factors included as explanatory variables in the two equations, but rather to unobserved factors for which variables were not available.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 shows estimates of a Bivariate Probit model for the two decisions estimated simultaneously using full information maximum likelihood.
Columns (1) and (3) show the same model specification with correction for the panel nature of the data gathering process. The relatively rich specification includes variables related to the expected value of the loss, the threat advisory level, a variable indicating past decisions by subjects, and some demographic variables. Map cost is important in determining whether a subject purchases the map, and the sign of the coefficient is consistent with expectations. The level of threat, as indicated by the advisory color code, is statistically significant and has the expected positive effect on the probability of buying more a more detailed map. The amount of potential loss is also significant and a positive factor in increasing the likelihood that the subject will buy additional threat information.
Subjects display habitual behavior in that they are more likely to buy a map if they purchased one previously. Neither age nor gender appears to be a factor in obtaining more detailed threat information.
The coefficient on the wealth variable (the natural log of accumulated experiment wealth) is negative and statistically significant. This result could be interpreted as evidence for less need of map information as subjects get wealthier, due to subjects selfinsuring. However it is difficult to imagine how anyone can effectively self-insure against terrorist attacks in the same way they self-insure against property damage, or illhealth. Wealth could be acting as a proxy for experience with the game, since for most subjects in this experiment wealth increases as the game progresses, but not linearly depending on their map purchases. To test for repeated exposure to the risk, a variable was explicitly included in the models. For both the map purchase and the threat response the effect of repeated exposure is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the negative wealth effect is not a proxy for experience, but has another explanation. It could be that as subjects get wealthier, and experience no losses, they become less risk averse due to an under-estimate of the probability of loss.
While many variables have the same sign effect on map purchase and threat response, the magnitude of these impacts differs. Significantly the cost of the map affects the purchase decision but not the anticipated response to the threat. A similar result is found for the size of the loss, having a significant positive impact on the need for more detailed information, but no statistically significant impact on threat response. A relatively small set of variables are found to be significant determinants of threat response, limited to threat level, wealth and experience and age. Older subjects are less willing to consider costly responses to threats than are younger ones.
The result found for experience in the threat response equation allows us to test the "cry wolf" hypothesis. We find that repeated exposure to the threat warnings without actual terrorist attacks occurring do not reduce the perceived value of better threat information, nor the willingness to undertake costly actions in response to the threat.
While this does not constitute a direct test of the hypothesis, the result is consistent with actual observations of the willingness of people living in the United States to take the threat of terrorist attacks seriously, and incur significant and prolonged expenses in the name of mitigation and preparedness. Using equations (1) and (3) for both map purchase and threat response, Table 4 gives estimates of the marginal effects of each variable on the joint probabilities of buying more detailed threat information and responding to the threat information. The average probabilities show that the most likely course of action is to not buy the detailed information, but to consider some response to the threat. The least likely action is to buy the detailed map but take no action in response to the threat-which is very good news for policy makers supporting the dissemination of threat advisories. The largest marginal impact comes from wealth, with a negative effect on undertaking both decisions, but a positive effect on responding with only the original threat advisory information. Subjects are also relatively insensitive to the cost of more detailed information, another positive sign for policy makers seeking to improve the threat advisory system.
In summary, the empirical results provide evidence of rational behavior by subjects consistent with the expected utility theory. Subjects are less likely to purchase additional threat information (the map) the more it costs, but are more likely to purchase more detailed information at higher initial threat levels. This suggests that more serious threats require more detailed information to be provided to the population-a finding consistent with sociological research recognizing that people do not simply respond to commands from authority, but rather need credible and trustworthy information to support their own conclusions. Experiment subjects were more likely to buy the detailed map if they had bought one previously, which is a positive indication that they perceived the map to be of value in assessing the threat and deciding how to respond. There was no evidence from the experiments that subjects tired of repeated warnings. The only factor that discouraged subjects from valuing more information and responding accordingly was wealth. As subjects became wealthier they were less likely to want more detailed information, and this effect was stronger relative to the impact of wealth on the decision to respond to the threat information. This is a purely empirical finding, with no guidance from theory as to why this effect should emerge. The usual explanation of self-insurance for the wealthier does not seem plausible for terrorist-like risks unless people believe they can mitigate and protect themselves with costly expenditures.
There is evidence presented here that supports the claim that more geographically detailed threat warnings are valuable, and that resources should be expended to provide such information. What is less clear is the optimal level of this information, since the experiments also show that in only a third of cases was the detailed threat map bought, and that subjects were less likely to want the map if it was relatively more costly. Since the cost of such public information is implicit in the national tax system, and seemingly provided "free" to all citizens and residents, making the cost explicit in the experiments may make subjects more sensitive to price than they would be otherwise.
Further developments
At present the experiment does not explicitly recognize the cost of responding to threat warnings, or to changes in threat level. The GAO report on raising the HSAS threat level from yellow to orange suggests costs of this change in threat level could range from $3000 to $100 million per week, but warns that cost estimates are particularly speculative (GAO, 2004c, p.38.) Of course, these GAO estimates do not contain any estimates of private business or general public costs of increasing the threat level.
Anecdotal evidence from information sources such as the DHS, the Red Cross, or the government sponsored information web Ready.gov would suggest that response costs are certainly not negligible. Development of our experiments will involve treatments where subjects face costs of improved threat information and explicit costs of response to allow us to observe the expected tradeoff between the uncertainty that accompanies specific warnings and the costs of response. It is only reasonable to expect, given the current state of intelligence, more specific warnings will be associated with greater uncertainty regarding the risk to any individual, organization or geographical area.
Another development of the current instrument will include an investigation of alternative warning systems, and methods of communicating threat information. At present, some federal and state agencies report hearing about terrorist threats and changes in the HSAS level from the media before being notified by DHS (GAO, 2004c, p17.) At the same time, DHS has not chosen to use the existing multi-hazard and natural hazard warning systems already in place. We can investigate subject responses to these alternatives using our experimental design.
Currently our experiment does not contain a time element, so warnings and responses are essentially real-time to the subject. Even though one of the advantages of web-based experiments over other data gathering methods is the element of real time, it may limit our ability to observe behavior when the threat information is time sensitive.
Of course, just as experiments can compress time to make decisions, it also has the potential to compress the temporal relevance of information, so long as parallelism is established and maintained. Finally we envision using our experiments to place the HSAS, and other terrorist threat information systems, in a wider hazard context, and to consider the tradeoff and relative priorities of allocating resources to terrorist security versus more general natural hazard mitigation, preparedness and response.
